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This article conducts a review of the principal tools used in English criminal law, from 
the early modern period to the present, to impose limits on free expression, 
particularly the freedom to exhibit ‗hate‘, in pursuit of social order and to police the 
boundaries at which the acceptable is segregated from the unacceptable. Against 
this historical backdrop, the article assesses the controversial Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006, pointing to (dis)similarities with the preceding Bill and with the 
incitement to racial hatred measures on which the 2006 Act is modelled.  The 
discussion also explores whether, in light of European and domestic human rights 
law, the English law of blasphemy should be abolished. It continues with an 
evaluation of how far existing public order legislation, regarding ‗racially or religiously 
aggravated‘ offences, are adequate to cover the ground addressed not only by the 
newly enacted incitement to religious hatred offences but also both the older 
incitement to racial hatred legislation and the common law as to blasphemy.  It is 
argued that conflict over the mobilisation of criminal law to promote public civility is 
intrinsic not only to criminal law past and present but also to any pluralist polity 
committed to addressing social inequality. 
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Introduction 
Whilst the last successful prosecution for blasphemous libel took place in 1979,1 that 
the English law of blasphemy subsists in a modern, democratic, pluralistic, 
multicultural, multi-faith and largely secular society, continues to stimulate 
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considerable attention.2 The recurrent debate has centred upon whether the common 
law as to blasphemy should be retained, abolished without replacement or replaced 
by broader-based legislation which would extend the law to embrace non-Christians.3  
The debate resurfaced when — prompted by an escalation in verbal abuse and 
physical violence against Muslims and perceived Muslims following the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC4 — the then 
Home Secretary, David Blunkett, reportedly intimated that along with plans to 
introduce legislation criminalising incitement to religious hatred, consideration would 
be given to abolishing the blasphemy laws.5 
 
Introduced in the House of Commons on 12 November 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Bill included, at Part 5, measures that would penalise incitement 
to religious hatred. The Bill was scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights,6 before which David Blunkett indicated the proposed incitement to religious 
hatred offence would not be employed as a vehicle to abolish the blasphemy laws.7 
 
The incitement to religious hatred provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Bill were, however, withdrawn after encountering opposition from the House 
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of Lords.8 Nevertheless, and following two further failed attempts to legislate against 
inciting religious hatred — first, by Lord Avebury in a Private Member‘s Bill,9 and, 
secondly, by the Government under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill10 — 
the Government made clear that it remained committed to introducing an incitement 
to religious hatred offence,11 and that legislation in this regard would not be 
contingent upon the abolition of the law as to blasphemy.12 
 
On its return to power following the 2005 General Election, the Labour Government, 
in May of that year, re-introduced proposals designed to extend the racial hatred 
offences in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 to cover stirring up hatred against 
persons on religious grounds.13 The proposals, which replicate those that had been 
included in the earlier Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill and which the 
Government was forced to abandon in consequence of concerted opposition from the 
House of Lords preceding the 2005 General Election, were presented to the House 
of Commons as the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill on 09 June 2005.  The proposed 
legislation was subsequently debated in the House of Lords where, at committee 
stage, the Government suffered heavy defeats.14 Although the Government sought to 
overturn the amendments the Lords had secured against its proposals, the 
Government suffered two further defeats when the Bill returned to the Commons on 
31 January 2006.15  
 
Had the controversial Bill been enacted in the terms originally proposed, the 
legislation would have provided for the criminalisation of incitement to religious 
hatred on the basis of the legislative formula, in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986, 
which criminalises incitement to racial hatred.  Accordingly, the incitement to religious 
hatred measures the Government supported would have been grafted onto the 1986 
Act.16 As a result of amendments conceded to the Bill, however, congruence 
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between the incitement to racial hatred provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 and 
the religious hatred provisions of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is less 
pronounced than the Government had intended. 
 
The controversy attending the criminalisation of incitement to religious hatred is, at 
one level, located in and confined to a single focal point; that of how far free 
expression might be curtailed justly, by criminal sanction, in order to protect those 
identified with a particular category of individuals from incited hatred.  At another, the 
furore stimulated by the proposed and enacted incitement to religious hatred 
offences rests on the defensibility of analogising religious hatred with racial hatred.  
However, closer scrutiny reveals the controversy brings a cluster of related themes in 
to focus. These include such nebulous and contested concepts and constructs as 
culture, community and citizenship; identity and identification; ‗us-ness‘ and ‗they-
ness‘; legal authority and civic propriety; dissent and toleration; free expression, 
equality and pluralism. This article seeks to demonstrate these themes are of 
contemporary and historical salience for an understanding of the role played by 
coercive law in managing interpersonal and intergroup relations. The discussion 
begins with a review of the principal tools used in English criminal law, from the early 
modern period to the present, to impose limits on free expression, particularly the 
freedom to display ‗hate‘, in pursuit of social order.  In this way, it is shown that 
coercive measures, at common law and later by statute, have long served to 
supervise the boundaries at which the acceptable is segregated from the 
unacceptable. The article then discusses the Racial and Religious Hatred 2006 Act, 
its (dis)similarities with the preceding Bill and with the incitement to racial hatred 
measures on which the 2006 Act is modelled. The discussion also explores whether, 
in light of European and domestic human rights law, the English law of blasphemy 
should now be abolished. It goes on to assess how far existing public order 
legislation, and accompanying sentence enhancement provisions regarding ‗racially 
or religiously aggravated‘ offences, are adequate to cover the ground addressed not 
only by the newly enacted incitement to religious hatred offences but also both the 
older incitement to racial hatred legislation and the common law as to blasphemy.  It 
is argued that contestation over the mobilisation of criminal law to promote public 
civility and social justice is intrinsic not only to criminal law past and criminal law 
present but also to any polity committed to addressing social inequality. 
 
I: Unpalatable Expression in Early Modern English Law 





The early modern English state had several instruments at its disposal with which to 
suppress and punish utterances and writings deemed threatening to or hostile of 
government, its institutions, organs, officials or interests.  One such may be seen in 
the Scandalum Magnatum statute of 1275, which provided for the punishment of 
those who would ―be so hardy to cite or publish any false news or tales whereby 
discord or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the King and his people 
or the great men of the realm‖.17  
 
As an alternative to using Scandalum Magnatum,18 royal governments might draw 
upon laws relating to treason.19  Having evolved from Germanic and Roman roots,20 
the crime of treason was first placed on a statutory footing in 1352.21  For the offence 
to be found, the 1352 statute appears to require the compassing of the monarch‘s 
removal or death by way of an overt act, rather than by words alone.  However, both 
prior to and following the enactment, a wide range of purportedly subversive 
activities, including dissident expression, were construed and punished as 
treasonous.22 Thus, the concepts of treason, traitor and treachery proved sufficiently 
elastic, under monarchical government, to embrace spoken and written words.23  
Nevertheless, although Scandalum Magnatum and the treason laws proved useful in 
restraining expression and activity seen as possessing the potential to incite loss of 
confidence in the established institutions of church and state, the law as to criminal 
libel presented a more efficient instrument of control.24 
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By the late 1400s, the first printing press had been set up, as had the Court of Star 
Chamber; and while the former would broaden the availability of the written word, the 
latter would, through the crime of libel, monitor, discourage and punish matter 
considered detrimental to established church-state order.25  Seditious libel evolved in 
the conciliar court as one of four forms of criminal libel — the others being 
blasphemous libel, obscene libel and defamatory libel26 — and was authoritatively 
formulated in the 1605 case of De Libellis Famosis.27 The defendant, Lewis 
Pickering, was accused of composing and publishing a poem defaming the recently 
deceased Archbishop of Canterbury and his successor.28 Pickering, relying on the 
common law of defamation,29 argued, albeit tentatively, he should not be convicted 
without proof of the falsity of the words in question.30 The Attorney-General, Edward 
Coke, countered that a libel against a servant of the crown is a greater offence than 
one against a private person: 
 
[F]or it concerns not only the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of 
Government; for what greater scandal of Government can there be than to have 
corrupt or wicked magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the King to 
govern his subjects under him?  And greater imputation to the State cannot be, 
than to suffer such corrupt men to sit in the sacred seat of justice, or to have any 
meddling in or concerning the administration of justice.31 
 
Focusing on the supposed effects of seditious libels, enabled Coke to reason, or be 
understood as having reasoned,32 that it be immaterial whether the alleged libeller 
was possessed of a non-malicious intention and that a defendant may not plead the 
truth or accuracy of the matter as a defence. Thus, the accused was found to have 
libelled a public official and, by extension, both the crown and its government to a 
seditious degree. 
 
Following the demise of absolute monarchy, the Court of Star Chamber was 
abolished in 1641. At the Restoration, the Court of King‘s Bench inherited the 
criminal jurisdiction formerly administered by the Star Chamber court and, thereafter, 
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the law of criminal libel developed in the common law courts.33 The substantive law 
regarding criminal libels remained intact immediately after it was assimilated into the 
common law, since common law judges reserved to themselves the right to 
determine whether the words at issue contravened the criminal law.34 The functions 
of judge and jury at this period were such that the jury was precluded from 
considering the alleged libeller‘s intentions and from deciding whether the words 
prosecuted constituted one or other form of criminal libel. The jury, therefore, was 
restricted to addressing the factual questions of whether the defendant had published 
the words at issue and of whether the words carried the meaning attributed to them 
by the prosecution. Thus, whether the words amounted to a criminal libel was a 
matter of law rather than fact and, therefore, for the judge to rule upon.35 
 
The respective functions of judge and jury in libel trials was, however, repeatedly 
challenged over the course of the 1700s, with the effect that libel prosecutions 
became ever more problematic.36 Increasing dissatisfaction with the prevailing 
common law stance on the province of judge vis-à-vis jury culminated in Fox‘s Libel 
Act of 1792,37 which formally empowered the jury to assess whether the words in 
question amounted to a libel and to deliver a general verdict on the whole matter put 
before it.38 
 
The 1792 Act notwithstanding, the incidence of libel prosecutions rose significantly 
over the late 1700s and early 1800s, and began to decline thereafter.39 The 
decreasing efficacy of this hitherto favoured means of restricting impermissible 
expression was accompanied by mounting uncertainty as to the procedural and 
substantive conditions required to secure conviction. Indeed, it appears the rapid 
decline in prosecutions was, in large part, actuated by difficulties prosecutors 
encountered in their attempts to persuade judge and jury that the words complained 
of were sufficiently scurrilous to constitute either a seditious or a blasphemous libel.  
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In short, the proposition that culpability did not require consideration of whether the 
defendant was possessed of malicious intent and the contention that the prosecuted 
words necessarily carried a tendency to provoke a breach of the peace were 
increasingly subject to challenge.40 
 
Stephen, in responding to ambiguities concerning the contours of the existing law, 
advanced that seditious libel consisted in the publication of oral or written words with 
seditious intent.41 He defined seditious intent as: 
 
… an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against 
the person of, Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, or the Government and 
Constitution of the United Kingdom, as by law established, or either House of 
Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite Her Majesty‘s subjects to 
attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in Church or 
State by law established, or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her 
Majesty‘s subjects, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different 
classes of Her Majesty‘s subjects.42 
 
This delineation of the offence, which was later accepted in the 1886 case of R v 
Burns,43 came to be understood as requiring an intention on the part of the accused 
not merely to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility but rather to incite violent 
disorder for the purpose of disturbing constituted authority.44 The considerable 
evidential difficulties presented by the accepted formulation of the common law 
offence,45 brought two corollaries. First, prosecutions and the threat of prosecutions 
for seditious libel ceased to function as the primary means through which 
government might restrain expression and activity considered destructive of its 
interests.46 Second, the law relating to public order came to be preferred over 
seditious libel to punish expression fomenting or likely to foment public discord.47 
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It would appear, then, that during the period from when jurisdiction over criminal 
libels was first inherited by the common law courts to the mid 1700s, the substantive 
law as to both blasphemous and seditious libels did not vary appreciably. From 
around the late 1700s, however, judicial rulings on the constituent elements of 
blasphemous libel served to transform the offence.48 By the end of the 1800s, 
blasphemous libel had mutated from a crime which penalised any attack or criticism, 
regardless of how reasonably expressed, on the established church or fundamental 
tenets of Christianity, to one where criminal liability would arise only where the words 
prosecuted had not been expressed in sufficiently sober and temperate terms.49 It 
also appears that while the law regarding blasphemous libel received modification 
chiefly through judicial intervention, adjustments to seditious libel were brought about 
or formalised by the largely procedural amendments effected by Fox‘s Libel Act 
1792, Lord Campbell‘s Libel Act 1843,50 and the  Criminal Evidence Act 1898.51 
 
Neither a lack of judicial activism in the common law of seditious libel nor an absence 
of legislative activity in blasphemous libels is being suggested here. The weighting is, 
rather, one of emphasis since the Acts of 1792, 1843 and 1898 influenced all criminal 
libels, and judicial activity is visible in both seditious and blasphemous libels.  
However, while judges were instrumental in the formulation of a more identifiable and 
specific mens rea requirement for seditious libels, judicial attempts to establish a 
distinct mental element for blasphemous libels proved futile, in that the offence 
survives as one of strict liability.52 The amalgam of statutory and judicial adjustments 
to the composition and compass of libel offences, nevertheless, contributed to the 
decline of seditious libel, blasphemous libel and indeed public mischief 
                                                                                                                                            
public tranquillity and to punish those who would urge disloyalty in state agents, see T. Bunyan, The 
History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (London: Friedmann, 1976) pp. 28-36. See also 
Williams, ibid., pp. 179-197; C. Townshend, Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in 
Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp.94-104; Law Commission, Working Paper 
No. 72, supra., n. 45. 79-89. 
47
 See Lobban, supra., n. 36, pp. 321-352; Williams, supra., n. 45, p. 155. 
48
 A statute of 1697 (9 & 10 Will. III, c. 32) made it an offence for any person, having been educated in, 
or having made a profession of, the Christian religion to assert or maintain views contrary to the 
Christian religion (see Stephen, supra., n. 17, pp. 468-469; C Kenny, supra., n. 3, pp. 120-121; Nash, 
1999, supra., n. 3, pp. 28-29). There having been few, if any, prosecutions alleging violation of its 
provisions and having been deemed obsolete by the Law Commission in the 1960s, the statute, 
otherwise known as the Blasphemy Act, was repealed by s. 13, Schedule 4, Part I of the Criminal Law 
Act 1967 (see Law Commission, Working Paper, No 79, supra., n. 2, para. 2.24). 
49
 See Kenny, supra., n. 3, pp. 136-142; Bryan, supra., n. 2, pp. 340-342. 
50
 For a judicial evaluation of the significance of the 1843 Act, see R v Holbrook (1878) QBD 42. See 
also Law Commission, Working Paper No. 84, supra., n. 17.2.10-213. 
51
 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 rendered defendants competent to testify as a witness 
in their own defence. 
52
 See Whitehouse v  Lemon [1979] AC 617; Law Commission, Working Paper No 79, supra., n. 2, para. 
6.3; Bryan, supra., n. 2, pp. 343-347. 





prosecutions.53 With the common law found wanting, concerns to better segregate 
expression and conduct that ought to be tolerated from expression and conduct 
which potentially or actually disturbs public order, would be policed through 
legislation. 
 
II: Incitement to Racial Hatred  
Various, often local, public order measures and, in due course, the  Public Order Act 
1936 appealed to government in its efforts to better regulate provocative expression 
and conduct liable to provoke a breach of the peace.54 While the activities of the 
British Union of Fascists and the violence these activities occasioned between 
members of the British Union of Fascists and their Jewish, communist and anti-
fascist opponents in London and elsewhere — together with difficulties encountered 
by law enforcement personnel in dealing with the violence — provided the immediate 
impetus for the 1936 Act, the legislation assisted in the supervision and control of 
deeds and words threatening to the domestic tranquillity of the nation state and its 
political process.55 
 
Framed to penalise unacceptable conduct and expression without limiting freedom of 
movement, association and expression unduly,56 the 1936 Act criminalised the 
wearing of uniforms for political purposes; proscribed the formation of paramilitary 
organisations; prohibited the possession of offensive weapons at public meetings; 
and provided the police with powers to alter the route of, or prohibit, marches, 
processions and assemblies likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The Public Order 
Act 1936 also made it an offence, under section 5, for any person in any public place 
or any public meeting to use ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘57 words or behaviour 
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with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace was 
likely to be occasioned. 
 
When contrasted with the common law of sedition and public mischief, prosecutions 
and the prospect of prosecution for transgressing section 5 appear to have had 
considerable success in placing constraints on the use of words designed to incite, or 
having the effect of inciting, violent manifestations of hatred.58 That said, as the 
provision targeted incitement to public violence generally and addressed violence 
motivated by racial hatred only obliquely, campaigners during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s petitioned strenuously to modify section 5.59 The Conservative 
Government was not, however, persuaded of a pressing need to amend section 5 in 
order to provide for the criminalisation of incitement to racial hatred.60 It preferred 
instead to increase the maximum penalty for the section 5 offence through the Public 
Order Act 1963.61 Committing itself to the introduction of legislation prohibiting 
incitement to racial hatred whilst in opposition, the newly elected Labour Government 
gained Parliamentary support for such provision to be included in Britain‘s first anti-
discrimination legislation, the Race Relations Act 1965.62 Section 6(1) of the 1965 Act 
was unprecedented in providing that an offence is committed if any person, ―with 
intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Great Britain distinguished 
by colour, race or ethnic or national origins‖ (a) publishes or distributes written matter 
which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or (b) uses in any public place or at any 
public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being matter or 
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words likely to stir up hatred against that section on grounds of colour, race or 
national origins.63 
 
The measure made threatening, abusive or insulting ‗words‘ and ‗written matter‘, 
when used in a public place with intent to stir up racial hatred, punishable and did so 
without reference either to an intent to provoke a breach of the peace or to a 
likelihood of a breach of the peace being occasioned.  It, therefore, contrasts with its 
predecessor, section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, in that the latter focused upon 
words and behaviour, not written matter, intended or liable to provoke a breach of the 
peace.64 Nonetheless, section 6(1) of the Race Relations Act 1965 proved 
problematic, generating unease over the legal import of such terms as ‗insulting‘, 
‗abusive‘, ‗insulting‘ and ‗hatred‘; the obligation to prove accused persons intended to 
incite racial hatred;65 the absence of a breach of the peace requirement; the 
stipulation that prosecutions could only take place when conducted by, or with the 
consent of, the Attorney-General;66 the use of criminal sanctions either to discourage 
hatred or to promote harmonious community relations; the value and scope of free 
speech; the potential for both successful and unsuccessful prosecutions to afford 
publicity to distasteful views; the absence of provision prohibiting incitement to 
religious hatred; the alleged reluctance to prosecute offenders; and the extent to 
which individuals were evading prosecution by the use of more refined and less 
virulent racial invective.67 
 
It was in the light of this unease that provision was made not only for placing a 
revised incitement to racial hatred offence within the relevant public order legislation 
rather than within statutes focusing on race relations but also for relaxing the intent to 
be proved for the offence.68 Thus, the Race Relations Act 1976, by section 70, 
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inserted a section 5A into the Public Order Act 1936, replacing the original section 5 
offence.  The new section made it an offence for a person (a) to publish or distribute 
written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or (b) to use in any public 
place or meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting in circumstances 
where hatred is likely to be stirred up against any racial group in Great Britain.69  
While the revised provision retained the requirement of prosecution only by, or with 
the consent of, the Attorney-General,70 it discarded the obligation to prove the 
accused intended to stir up racial hatred. Prosecutions under section 5A were, 
however, infrequent as difficulties remained over establishing the elements of the 
offence against accused persons and misgivings continued to be voiced both as to 
the role of the Attorney-General and as to whether the provision inhibited free 
expression unnecessarily.71 
 
Consequently, section 5A of the Public Order Act 1936 was replaced by the six racial 
hatred provisions contained in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986.72  Each of the 
offences — for which proceedings may not be instituted except by, or with the 
consent of, the Attorney-General73 — require an intention to stir up racial hatred or 
proof that racial hatred was likely, having regard to all the circumstances, to be 
stirred up.74 Each also require that the prosecuted words, behaviour or visible 
representation be ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘.75 There is no requirement, 
however, to prove that racial hatred was stirred up and no requirement to prove 
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either an intention to provoke a breach of the peace or that a breach of the peace 
was occasioned by the words, behaviour or visible representation at issue.76 
 
Although several possible justifications have been suggested as underpinning the 
scheme adopted in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986,77 questions remain over the 
merits and desirability of imposing criminal sanctions on words, behaviour or displays 
where used with intent to provoke, or deemed likely to provoke, racial hatred.78  
Thus, a favourable assessment would observe that, viewed against earlier racial 
hatred measures,79 the offences in Part III consolidate, revise, extend and therefore 
strengthen the entirely justifiable law penalising incitement to racial hatred.80 
 
A less enthusiastic evaluation, however, would view the racial hatred provisions as 
representing an objectionably fragile settlement between the objectives of 
safeguarding freedom of expression, protecting citizens characterised as falling 
within a ‗racial group‘81 from violent manifestations of bigotry and of regulating social 
conduct in pursuit of greater public civility and community cohesion. On this view, the 
many definitional ambiguities, along with uncertainty as to objectives, structural 
design, and operation, are symptomatic of difficulties inherent in any legislative 
attempt to curtail free expression through, or by the prospect of, criminal penalty on 
the basis that words, activity and matter considered unpalatable, offensive or hostile 
can be sufficiently ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘ so as to stimulate racial hatred 
against a legally recognised ‗racial group‘, even where the words, activity and matter 
are not shown to have provoked a display of racial hatred or to have occasioned a 
breach of the peace.82 
 
III: Incitement to Religious Hatred, Blasphemy and Human Rights 
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Were it enacted without revision, the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill would have 
added the words ‗or religious‘ to the existing incitement to racial hatred offences.  It 
would also have replaced the provisions in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 
addressing words, behaviour and matter that are either intended or likely, having 
regard to all the circumstances, to stir up racial hatred, with a requirement that the 
words, behaviour or matter be either intended to stir up racial or religious hatred or 
―likely to be seen or heard by a person in whom it is likely that racial or religious 
hatred would be stirred up‖.83 Furthermore, the Bill would have retained the 
‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘ formula in the 1986 Act so that ‗threatening, 
abusive or insulting‘ words, behaviour or matter intended or likely to stir up either 
racial or religious hatred would be liable to punishment.84 Amendments secured 
against the Bill, however, operate so that the provisions of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 render words, behaviour and material punishable when proved to be 
both ‗threatening‘ — as distinct from ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘ — and used 
with intent to stir up religious hatred. The provisions of the 2006 Act, therefore, differ 
in several respects from those proposed in the Bill.  Indeed, although the title of the 
Act suggests significant legislative intervention in respect to racial and religious 
hatred, its influence on the former is limited to amending section 24A of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 so as to exempt the existing racial hatred and the 
newly enacted religious hatred offences from the power of citizens‘ arrest.85 
 
Before turning to particular sites where the 2006 Act departs both from the Bill and 
Part III of the 1986 Act, it may be observed that the 2006 Act is consistent with Part 
III of the 1986 Act, on which it is loosely modelled, in that it too stipulates that no 
prosecution may proceed except by, or with the consent of, the Attorney-General.86  
Further, while an offence under section 18 of the 1986 Act and under the comparable 
section of the 2006 Act, section 29B, may be committed in either a public or private 
place, both sections provide for the saving that no offence is committed where the 
words or behaviour are used, or material displayed, within a dwelling and not seen or 
heard by others than those inside that dwelling.87 
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Nonetheless, the key areas of variance between, on the one hand, Part III of the 
Public Order Act 1986 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill and, on the other, the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 can be set out as follows. First, rather than 
append the words ‗or religious‘ to the racial hatred offences in Part III of the 1986 
Public Order Act, the 2006 Act inserts a stand-alone Part IIIA into the 1986 Act which 
provides for a range of offences involving the stirring up of ―hatred against a group of 
persons defined by their religious belief or lack of religious belief‖.88 Second, in 
criminalising words, behaviour and matter intended — though not those prone or 
likely — to incite religious hatred, the 2006 Act eschews emulating faithfully the 
approach taken in Part III of the 1986 to racial hatred. Thus, whereas the racial 
hatred offences require the prosecution to establish either an intention to stir up racial 
hatred or demonstrate that racial hatred was likely to be stirred up, the mens rea 
required for the offences introduced under the 2006 Act raise the prospect of criminal 
liability only where the accused intends to stir up religious hatred.89 Third, the Bill was 
amended to include a clause which makes specific reference to the protection of free 
expression.90 
 
The dissimilarities between Part III of the 1986 Act and the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Bill on the one hand, and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 on the 
other, are such that the latter can be regarded as an enfeebled attempt to remedy the 
unsatisfactory position in which the law as to incitement to racial hatred affords a 
degree of protection to Jews and Sikhs, as racial groups,91 from hate speech but 
denies such protection to Muslims and Christians.  For that matter, the 2006 Act may 
also be seen as ill-considered since it overlooks the discriminatory character of the 
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English law of blasphemy. The common law offence of blasphemy, in affording 
protection from hostility, outrage and insult to the religious sensibilities of Christians 
alone,92 is deficient and unsatisfactory.93 However, the attempt in the 2006 Act, itself 
a diluted version of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, to criminalise displays of 
hatred directed against a group of persons defined by their religious belief or lack of 
religious belief, appears as a somewhat desultory consequence of preferring neither 
to widen the protection afforded under the blasphemy laws so as to embrace non-
Christian faiths nor, in the alternative, to abolish the antiquated common law as to 
blasphemy. 
 
The Law Commission, in its 1981 Working Paper94 and its 1985 Report,95 opposed 
the imposition of criminal sanctions on matter found offensive to the religious feelings 
of believers under a broadened blasphemy law.  A broader-based blasphemy law 
would, in the Law Commission‘s view, place excessive restrictions on free expression 
and exclude from its ambit matter offensive to the deeply-held feelings of those who 
neither adhere to nor affirm religious faith.96 For the Law Commission such 
considerations argued against both the extension and the retention of the common 
law relating to blasphemy. Nevertheless, the sincere and seemingly pervasive belief 
that the blasphemy laws should be retained in order to protect the religious 
sensibilities of Christians, the historically Christian character of the British state and 
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the Christian identity of the preponderance of its citizens,97 appears to have militated 
against the speedy implementation of the Law Commission‘s recommendation that 
the blasphemy laws be abolished.98 
 
Moreover, as the previous century drew to close, proponents of the view that the 
English law of blasphemy is warranted received additional support from the 
European Court of Human Rights cases of Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria99 and 
Wingrove v UK.100 The European Court of Human Rights ruled in these cases that 
where a state‘s laws interfere with freedom of expression — as secured under Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) — so as to protect its 
citizens, specifically those of the majority faith, from having their religious feelings 
outraged and to safeguard their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
— as secured under Article 9 of the ECHR — such laws are unlikely to be judged 
arbitrary or excessive.  The Court added that a ‗margin of appreciation‘ is accorded to 
states under which freedom of expression may be infringed in order to protect the 
religious feelings of Christians from outrage.101 
 
However, the European Court of Human Rights‘ effective endorsement, in Otto-
Preminger and Wingrove, of state laws penalising the causing of offence to the 
religious feelings of Christians predates the introduction of domestic legislation, the 
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Human Rights Act 1998 (crafted to ensure rights guaranteed under the ECHR are 
realized directly in British law). The point here is that following the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the prospects for the survival of an enforceable English law 
of blasphemy would seem slight. This supposition has its grounding in the 
observation that the ‗margin of appreciation‘ doctrine is not available when 
‗Convention rights‘, secured in domestic law by the 1998 Act, are at issue in a 
national court.102 Therefore, should questions over the compatibility of the blasphemy 
laws with rights protected under the Convention be raised in an English court, that 
court would have little or no basis for relying on Otto-Preminger or Wingrove to find 
the common law as to blasphemy ECHR-compliant.103 
 
IV: Lesser Hostility and Aggravation 
Setting aside the possible efficacy, latent limitations and symbolic significance of the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, the case against the continued retention of the 
blasphemy offences,104 that against criminalising religious hatred105 — and, for that 
matter, the case against criminalising racial hatred — gains support from the 
presence of other potentially suitable offences within the Public Order Act 1986.  
Whilst not directly concerned with incitement to hatred, the offences carry the 
potential to punish words and deeds impelled by hatred of another.  Furthermore, the 
three pertinent public order offences make no specific requirement for proof of either 
racial or indeed religious animus and each attract increased penalties where the 
sentencing court accepts the offender‘s conduct reveals an element of racial or 
religious aggravation.106 
 
The first, which supersedes section 5 of the 1936 Public Order Act, is provided for 
under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986.  This provision renders criminally liable 
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the individual who is proved to have (a) used, towards another person, ‗threatening, 
abusive or insulting‘ words or behaviour; or (b) distributed or displayed, to another 
person,107 any visible representation which is ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘, 
where it is also proved that the individual did so with intent either to cause the other 
person to believe immediate unlawful violence would be used or to provoke such 
violence.108 The remaining two offences are set out in sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 
Act. Section 4A109 provides that an offence is committed when an individual, with 
intent to cause another person ‗harassment, alarm or distress‘, uses (a) ‗threatening, 
abusive or insulting‘ words or behaviour or (b) any visible representation which is 
‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘, where it is also proved ‗harassment, alarm or 
distress‘ was caused. Section 5 is similar to section 4A in three respects. First, it too 
requires the words or behaviour to be ‗threatening, abusive or insulting‘.110  Second, 
neither section requires the prohibited words or behaviour to be used towards 
another person. And third, neither section requires proof that the ‗threatening, 
abusive or insulting‘ words or behaviour gave rise to violence or to the risk that 
violence may have been provoked or believed likely.111 However, section 5 differs 
from section 4A in the respect that the relevant words or behaviour are not required 
to cause ‗harassment, alarm or distress‘ since it is sufficient ‗harassment, alarm or 
distress‘ is likely to be caused to a person in whose hearing or sight the words or 
behaviour occur.  Nevertheless, while no explicit reference is made in the statute to 
public disorder or the threat of disorder being an ingredient of either the section 4A or 
section 5 offences, a public disorder element appears to have been read into the 
measures by the courts.112 
 
The nature and scope of these three public order offences are such, therefore, as to 
suggest them capable of punishing the use of words, behaviour and material which 
arouse violence, the fear of violence or ‗harassment, alarm or distress‘.  Furthermore, 
the viability of proceedings under section 4, 4A or 5 of the 1986 Act as a functional 
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alternative to prosecutions alleging religious hatred, racial hatred or contravention of 
the blasphemy laws is augmented by two additional considerations. First, the 
provisions place no express obligation upon the prosecution to establish the 
prohibited conduct was driven by racial or religious hatred or that the conduct was 
designed either to vilify, or provoke displays of hatred against, any identifiable social 
group.113 Second, as a result of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,114 where the 
prosecution prove a section 4, 4A or 5 offence and also prove the relevant ‗ordinary‘ 
or ‗basic‘ offence was ‗racially or religiously aggravated‘,115 the offender will be liable 
to a higher maximum penalty than that available to the courts for the unaggravated 
offence.116 
 
Moreover, the meaning of ‗racial group‘, for the purposes of racial aggravation,117 
appears to have been given a broader construction than that laid down for racial 
hatred under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986.118  Also, ‗religious group‘, for the 
religiously aggravated offences, refers to ‗religious belief or lack of religious belief‘.119  
Thus, the compass of sections 4, 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act — with each being 
subject to increased penalties on proof of being ‗racially or religiously aggravated‘ — 
would seem to argue against the prosecution of wounding words, behaviour or matter 
on the basis of contravening an incitement to religious hatred offence, an incitement 
to racial hatred offence or as infringing the law relating to blasphemy. 
 
V: Free Expression, the Reprehensible and Citizenship 
How far it may be argued convincingly that the provisions of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 are structured with sufficient precision to enable individuals to 
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regulate their conduct in accordance with the statute, are both appropriate and 
proportionate to the object pursued and are necessary to meet a pressing social 
need is highly debatable.120 Further, while the 2006 Act is demonstrative of a 
commitment to criminalise incitement to religious hatred, it contrasts so markedly with 
earlier government-sponsored attempts, in particular the Racial and Religious Hatred 
Bill, as to cast doubt over its purpose and practical effect.  Not only are the offences 
limited to ‗threatening‘ words, behaviour and matter that are proved to have been 
intended to stir up religious hatred; alleged offenders are provided, under section 
29J, with an apparent freedom to insult defence;121 criminal proceedings may not be 
instituted unless by, or with the consent of, the Attorney-General;122 and few 
complaints are expected to progress to successful prosecution.123 
 
Relatedly, the rationale for basing the religious hatred offences on the racial hatred 
provisions in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 has not been made clear.  Even if 
the impetus rests in an escalation of incidents of religious hatred, the legislature 
might reasonably expect to have been provided with compelling and reliable 
evidence of its extent and, thereafter, to accept fully the contention that expressions 
of hostility towards individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs raise problems 
comparable, in kind and or degree, to those that necessitated the introduction of laws 
penalising the stirring up of racial hatred. Also, if the repeated attempts to affix ‗or 
religious‘ to the existing incitement to racial hatred offences are to be seen as sincere 
efforts to punish religious hatred, the paucity of prosecutions and convictions under 
Part III of the 1986 Act is hardly a feature of the racial hatred provisions which would 
inspire confidence.124 
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The legislation, as proposed and eventually enacted, may have been driven, in part, 
by concerns that those who use words, behaviour and material ostensibly to express 
hostility towards others on the basis of their religious beliefs, but in substance to 
incite racial hatred, evade prosecution for incitement to racial hatred. That being so, 
rather than introduce incitement to religious hatred legislation, a more appropriate 
response would be to amend Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 so that ‗racial 
group‘ status is accorded to individuals who identify themselves as, or are perceived 
by the alleged offender as, members of a multi-ethnic religious group.125 Indeed, 
considered attention might have been given to replacing the requirements for ‗racial 
group‘ with phrasing drawn from legislation stipulating an offence is committed where 
the offender demonstrates hostility ‗based on the victim‘s membership of (or 
presumed membership of) a racial or religious group‘ or is motivated by hostility 
towards members of a racial or religious group.126 The point here is that since ‗racial 
group‘ and ‗religious group‘ are broadly defined for the purposes of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, analogous constructions might have been applied to legislation 
targeting racial and religious hatred. However, given the terrain covered by sections 
4, 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and given each of these public order 
offences are subject to a higher maximum penalty when racially or religiously 
aggravated, principled, robust and closely argued justifications for the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006 are difficult to make out. 
 
The provisions in the 2006 Act are, it is claimed, designed to ensure ―the criminal law 
protects all groups of persons defined by their religious beliefs or lack of religious 
belief from having religious hatred intentionally stirred up against them‖.127 The 
protection from hatred, then, is afforded to the believer (and non-believer) rather than 
to the belief (or non-belief).128 To this one might contend that since the blasphemy 
laws protect the religious feelings of Christians from outrage, the common law and 
the 2006 Act have such considerable propinquity that case for retaining the law 
relating to blasphemy has become ever more unsustainable. 
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The freedom of expression safeguard, at section 29J of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006, also warrants further comment. Since both the racial hatred 
provisions in Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 and the religious hatred provisions 
of the 2006 Act must, in keeping with all domestic legislation, be read and given 
effect in a way that is compatible with Convention rights,129 the necessity for the 
inclusion of such a free expression clause is open to dispute.  Whilst its insertion may 
well have been intended as no more than an overt declaration of the importance of 
free expression, it is likely to lend support to the impression that the statute is to be 
understood as requiring free expression principles to prevail when challenged by 
words, conduct or matter alleged to be both ‗threatening‘ and used with intent to stir 
up religious hatred. However, as free expression necessarily comprises both freedom 
from that considered offensive and freedom to cause offence,130 section 29J is liable 
to operate so that the provisions of the 2006 Act collapse in upon themselves. 
 
Sensitivity in early-modern, modern and late-modern governments to matters 
perceived as inimical to, or in defiance of, the established socio-political order have 
often induced the use of coercive laws to restrict freedom of expression. The 
deployment of the Scandalum Magnatum statute of 1275, the treason laws and, in 
turn, the law of criminal libel — blasphemous, obscene, defamatory and seditious — 
may be seen as being impelled by concerns to protect the state, its officials and 
institutions from matter thought scurrilous, destabilising and tending to foment 
discord among the citizenry. A freedom to exchange views could not be permitted to 
extend to expressions and activity deemed subversive of government, its affairs or 
reputation. 
 
Correlative with the emergence and promulgation of liberal democratic conceptions 
of governance and of free expression, seditious libel evolved in the common law 
courts from a crime without a clearly specified mens rea element to one which 
obliged prosecutors to prove the accused intended to incite violence or public 
disorder and, thereby, to subvert constituted authority. Nevertheless, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the common law of seditious libel, blasphemous 
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libel and public mischief had lost status as effective weapons in the nation state‘s 
armoury directed to inhibit and punish reprehensible expression. 
 
Constructed in large part to codify the common law of sedition, section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936 reproduced the requirement for proof that the prosecuted words, 
behaviour or material were used either with intent to incite public disorder or in 
circumstances where public disorder was likely. Thus, the public order legislation 
placed emphasis on the preservation of public order and sought to restrict free 
expression only to the extent necessary to meet that object.  However, founded upon 
common law principles and premised upon idealised understandings of nationhood, 
shared national identity and citizenship,131 the 1936 Act was ill-equipped to deal with 
the growing presence of discernibly ‗alien‘ communities and the demonstrations of 
hatred that attended post-1945 ‗black‘ migration.132 Throughout this period — during 
which incitement to racial hatred offences were first introduced into UK law under the  
Race Relations Act 1965, were later amended and restructured as Part III of the 
Public Order Act 1986 — polarised positions have been articulated as to the utility of 
seeking, by criminal sanction, to curtail and discipline expression judged as 
objectionable and as intended or likely to provoke violent displays of racial hatred.133 
 
A similar polarisation of views is evident in the debates surrounding the racially or 
religiously aggravated offences and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.134  
However, little or no attention is given in those debates to the challenges any such 
legislation encounters in a pluralist nation state that seeks ‗social cohesion‘ on the 
basis of common and generally accepted values, and to ‗accommodate‘ or ‗integrate‘ 
manifold communities — closely or loosely characterised by reference to a variety of 
shared and distinctive cultural, historical, political, civic, collective and individual 
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identities and emotional attachments — within the wider British polity. The common 
law of blasphemy, the incitement to racial hatred offences, legislation making 
offences subject to a higher maximum penalty when motivated by hostility and the 
incitement to religious hatred legislation should be seen, then, in socio-legal and 
historical context.  When so viewed, it becomes evident these penal measures are to 
operate within a rapidly changing highly disparate and complex society. It is a society 
that has sought to steer a difficult path between competing concerns. That is, on the 
one hand, the promotion of commonly-held values, norms of acceptability, 
participatory citizenship, cohesiveness and belonging under constructions of a 
unitary national identity and, on the other, the pressures of devolution, 
disengagement, individualism, self-exclusion, involuntary exclusion, multiple 
identifications and fear or loathing of ‗other‘.135 
 
Conclusion 
Historically, nation states have made use of repressive laws not only to minimise 
disharmony, civil disorder and conflict within society but also to assist in the project to 
develop a cohesive and, therefore, manageable society. The project has not been 
discarded by late-modern nation states.136 Rather it has been forced to respond to 
the pressures, politics and discourses of globalisation, identity, citizenship, civil or 
human rights, autonomy, tolerance, respect, and equality with, not dichotomised 
from, difference. 
 
Contestation over whether restricting free expression, by criminal sanction, to protect 
particular citizens from violent displays of hatred is, then, to be expected. The 
contention reaches beyond conflicting perspectives on what may be deemed 
sufficiently unpalatable to warrant criminalisation and beyond the contested 
boundaries at which the acceptable is to be demarcated from the intolerable.  It 
fastens on to, or engages with, issues relating to the defence of the nation state from 
internal and external threats to peace, stability, security and economic prosperity.  It 
is also located in the assertion of historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, spatial and 
existential bonds for a cohering national identity. It entails, furthermore, questions 
over the role of law in securing individual rights and in the preservation of privileges 
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ensuing from national citizenship.137 Yet appeals to visions of a unitary, indivisible 
and sovereign nation state, to a distinct national identity and to national citizenship 
have an inherent inverse: the assertion of forms of ‗othering‘ with regard to 
individuals and groups viewed as ineligible for full citizenship.  Indeed, the volatility of 
this dynamic is revealed in conceptions of national citizenship which endeavour a 
stable equilibrium between the affirmation of diversity and difference, on the one 
hand, and the principle of equal and universal rights, on the other.138 
 
Whilst it is clear that law may be mobilised both to maintain and to reduce social 
inequality, the symbolic function of legislating against that deemed unpalatable and 
injurious to public order should not be overlooked. In affording those citizens who 
might be affronted or subjected to physical violence protection from unpalatable 
expression, the nation state proclaims its socio-legal commitment to the values of 
pluralism, equality (in respect of treatment, opportunity and outcomes) and 
deliberative democracy. Yet freedom of expression admits of freedom from 
unpalatable expression and accepts a degree of freedom to employ unpalatable 
expression. This compels, once again, the question of how far the freedom to employ 
objectionable expression or to express hate should be fettered by criminal penalty 
(rather than deterred by non-legal instruments and moral appeals for civility, 
moderation, mutual respect and so on). It also compels the further question of 
whether criminal sanctions provide the most appropriate means through which to 
confront words, behaviour and material hostile to another on the basis of their 
religious sensibilities, to those deemed to constitute a ‗racial group‘ or to ‗persons 
defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief‘.139 The blasphemy 
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laws, Part III of the Public Order Act 1986, the racially and religiously aggravated 
offences and the provisions of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 are 
instances in which these questions have not been provided with adequate answers.  
Nevertheless, the racial hatred, the penalty enhancement and the religious hatred 
offences purport to restrict free expression in order to protect citizens from either 
incited or actual manifestations of violent hatred. The English law of blasphemy, by 
contrast, restricts free expression only to protect the religious sensibilities of 
Christians from intemperate, affronting expression. Since the blasphemy laws 
postulate that the religious feelings of Christian citizens are more worthy of protection 
than the religious and non-religious feelings of others, this highly irregular feature of 
the criminal law can hardly be considered appropriate or desirable in a modern 
pluralist state. 
 
 
